My research is motivated by one major question: how do rules-based orders emerge and survive?
My work in economic history approaches the question from a legal angle, asking where Western Europe’s distinctive political and legal institutions came from. I put Harold Berman’s account of the Western legal tradition in dialogue with recent work by Schulz and Henrich on the medieval church’s kin-marriage prohibitions. My answer: by forbidding marriage among even distant cousins, the church scrambled aristocratic alliances, raised the risks of feuding, and drove nobles into ecclesiastical courts. The church came to govern Western Europe without an army, by fomenting demand for its legal services. My other work, on economic calculation and on the political economy of modern Singapore, asks the same question in contemporary settings. Together, these strands sketch a new history of commerce, in which religiously mediated law and thick capital markets create a feedback loop for long-run growth.
I’m also interested in the relationship between markets and ethics. My work on Adam Smith and Michael Polanyi explores how moral and scientific judgment depend on shared, tacit standards. My work in family economics asks how changing norms around commitment shape personal happiness.
My research questions often originate in close readings of texts in the history of economic and legal thought, and I return to these texts regularly. Scholars today stand at one end of a vast and intricately interlaced conversation, and I’m grateful for the opportunity to add to it in a small way.